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Abstract 
The aim of this work is to identify the determinants of health spending differentials 
among Italian regions, which could highlight the existence of potential margins for savings. 
The analysis exploits a dataset for the panel of the 21 Italian regions starting in the early 
1990s and ending in 2006. After having controlled for standard healthcare demand 
indicators, spending differentials appear to be associated with differences in the degree of 
appropriateness of the treatments, supply structure and social capital indicators. These results 
suggest that savings could be achieved without reducing the amount of services supplied to 
citizens. This is particularly important in view of the expected rise in health spending 
associated with the forecast demographic developments.   
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1.  Introduction
* 
Health spending represents a significant share of public and private budgets in Italy as in the 
majority of developed countries. Public health expenditure accounts for about 7 per cent of GDP 
and over the last decades it has been growing significantly faster than income. Given the expected 
population ageing, it is likely that spending will continue to increase in the future as well, raising 
a serious challenge to fiscal policy and the sustainability of public finances. According to recent 
projections published by the Economic Policy Committee (2009) and the OECD (2006), health 
spending is in fact the budget item with the highest expected growth rate among the age-related 
expenditures, not only in Italy but in other developed economies as well.  
Despite several measures aimed at improving the organisation of the system and the incentives 
provided  by  the  financing  mechanism,  the  Italian  national  health  system  (Sistema  Sanitario 
Nazionale or SSN) has historically displayed not only a sustained growth in outlays, but also 
large  deficits.  Expenditure  restraint  has  been  achieved  only  occasionally,  mainly  through 
measures with temporary effects on cash payments.
1  
The provision of healthcare in  Italy is the responsibility of the regional governments, within 
guidelines set at the central level to ensure that all citizens access similar amounts and quality of 
healthcare  (see  Piperno  and  Di  Orio,  1990;  Giannoni  and  Hitiris,  2002).  Notwithstanding  a 
significant redistribution of resources, there remain spending differentials between regions. These 
could be due to structural differences (such as demographic or epidemiological characteristics) or 
they could reflect differences in the quality of the services provided to patients and in the degree 
of  efficiency  in  the  use  of  public  resources.  In  the  latter  case,  spending  differentials  could 
highlight potential scope to improve the value for money in healthcare (i.e. reducing healthcare 
outlays and/or increasing the coverage and the quality of the service).  
The objective of this work is to examine whether saving margins exist by identifying the main 
drivers of regional spending differentials that are not due to structural differences in population or 
other determinants of healthcare demand. Other works have explored spending differentials in 
                                                 
*  Banca d’Italia, Structural Economic Analysis Department - Economics, Research and International Relations Area 
E-mail: maura.francese@bancaditalia.it; marzia.romanelli@bancaditalia.it. 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
We thank for their comments two anonymous referees, the colleagues at the Public Finance Division of the Bank of 
Italy, the discussant and the participants at conferences and seminars where previous versions of this work were 
presented. The usual disclaimers apply. 
1 For example, Bordignon and Turati (2009) suggest that the reason behind the expenditure reduction in the mid-
1990s  was  the  temporary  changes  in  the  expectations  of  the  regions,  which  at  the  time  perceived  central 
government’s threat not to bail them out in the event of spending overruns to be a credible one. Another explanation 
is the presence of flypaper effects (see Levaggi and Zanola, 2003) and the temporary reduction in transfers from the 
central to local governments in the early 1990s.      6 
order to ascertain whether they reflect differences in the quality and/or access to care (for the US 
see Skinner et al., 2001; Fisher et al., 2009), either focusing on certain types of services (for 
example hospital care as in Yasaitis et al., 2009) or on spending for particular public programmes 
and categories of treatments (for example Fisher et. al., 2003a, consider end-of-life spending for 
Medicare  beneficiaries  in  the  US).  These  works  suggest  that  higher  spending  does  not 
systematically reflect better quality or access, but that it is mainly linked to care practices (such 
as a greater orientation towards inpatient or specialist care) or to targeting specific care practices 
to the appropriate reference population (see for example Bodenheimer and Berry-Millet, 2009). 
Furthermore, higher spending does not appear to be systematically related to improved health 
outcomes or care satisfaction (Fisher et al., 2003b; Fowler et al., 2008). 
In this work we follow a more aggregate approach, considering per capita health expenditure in 
the Italian regions
2 and studying the drivers of unexplained differentials. In doing so we start with 
an approach similar to that used in the literature to compare health spending across countries.
3 In 
this respect our setting presents several advantages, given that it is reasonable to assume a similar 
structure of preferences, input prices and broad institutional arrangements throughout the country. 
Italian regions have a common legal and institutional framework and, as explained above, are 
mandated  to  provide  homogeneous  healthcare  coverage.
4  Importantly,  regions  share  common 
financing mechanisms. Notwithstanding the many changes and reforms, it can be taken that the 
resources made available at the regional level are based on the overall need for healthcare in each 
region and past spending,
5 independently of the source of financing and regional fiscal capacity.
6 
In practice, the central government has been responsible for filling the gap between the financial 
needs  of  each  region  and  the  actual  funding  derived  from  revenue  directly  collected  by  the 
regions (e.g. a regional tax on productive activities and a personal income surtax) and through an 
                                                 
2 In particular, we consider all the Italian regions, both ordinary (Piemonte, Lombardia, Veneto, Liguria, Emilia 
Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria) and special 
statute (Valle d’Aosta, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sicilia, Sardegna) plus the two autonomous provinces of Trento and 
Bolzano (which together form the special statute region of Trentino Alto Adige). 
3 For a survey of the literature and the methodological problems of international comparisons of health expenditure, 
see Gerdtham and Jönsson (2000). 
4 However, within given gudelines, regions are allowed to define some characteristics of the health system, such as 
for example the structure of the hospital network, the share of private providers and the extent to which they resort to 
direct distribution of pharmaceuticals. 
5 The recent measures on fiscal federalism also maintain the principle of equalising resources among the regions on 
the basis on the population’s need for healthcare. The challenge of the reform lies in defining the criteria (the 
‘standard costs’) to compute such needs. For a description of the evolution of the financing mechanisms of the SSN 
see Mapelli (2000) and Caroppo and Turati (2007). 
6 The fiscal capacity of the Italian regions is strongly (if not mainly) affected by the uneven distribution of the tax 
bases across the country (see De Matteis and Messina, 2009), which reflects the degree of economic development of 
the regions themselves and can be marginally changed by the economic policies adopted within each region.   7 
equalising centralised procedure which uses general fiscal revenues.
7 Given that the financing 
mechanism  and  equalising  procedure  are  common  to  all  the  regions,
8  their 
incentives/disincentives are likely to be the same, plausibly impacting on the overall level of 
spending but less on the regional differentials.  
In  order  to  set  the  background  for  the  empirical  analysis,  we  start  by  describing  health 
expenditure dynamics and their regional distribution. The third section presents the model from 
which we derive our estimating equations, describes the analysis of per capita regional spending 
determinants, identifies the drivers of observed differentials and discusses the results. The final 
section draws some conclusions.  
 
2.  Health expenditure developments and regional differentials 
Since  the  establishment  of  the  SSN,  total  public  spending  on  healthcare  has  increased 
significantly (from 5.1 per cent of GDP in 1979 to 7.3 per cent in 2010).
9 The considerable effort 
made to curb expenditure in the first part of the 1990s owing to the crisis experienced at that time 
and also in view of the need to meet the Maastricht criteria in order to qualify for admission in 
the Eurozone
10 was the only real exception: in the period 1991-95 the expenditure to GDP ratio 
fell by more than one percentage point. However, the nature of the decline was not structural and 
was achieved mainly through spending postponements and generalised cuts in cash outlays.
11 
Indeed, the positive results realised in the first half of the 1990s were more than offset by the 
large increase over the ensuing decade (Figure 1 and Table 1). 
The strong dynamics of health expenditure observed in Italy might reflect not only structural 
factors (such as the rising costs of new expensive technologies and population ageing) but also 
                                                 
7 In more recent years the effort to promote fiscal responsibility of the regions has been enhanced by the rules to 
discourage  the  formation  of  deficits  in  the  health  sector.  The  budget  for  2005  and  following  years  introduced 
automatic procedures for the appointment of special administrators and for increases in the regional income tax 
surcharge and tax on productive activities.  
8 Different arrangements are in place between the ordinary statute regions and the special statute ones (Valle d’Aosta, 
Trentino, Bolzano, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Sardegna and Sicilia). However this affects mainly the composition of 
financing (share of own resources versus funds drawn from national general taxation). The principle of providing 
comprehensive and homogeneous coverage through a national health system applies to all parts of the country. 
9 For the first fifteen years since the introduction of the SSN see also Franco (1993). 
10 As already noted, the existence of credible internal and external constraints during the first half of the 1990s might 
have contributed to expenditure containment (see Bordignon and Turati, 2009).  
11 In 1992, the SSN was reformed for the first time with the aim, on the one hand, of increasing competition among 
providers (both public and private) and, on the other, of strenghtening the planning phase. However, several of the 
measures approved over the years 1992-94 were in fact meant to curb expenditure in the short term, for example 
introducing co-payments for pharmaceuticals and medical and diagnostic services.   8 
the lack of effective use of public resources.
12 Since in future Italian public finances will have to 
absorb the costs of the expected demographic developments
13 and those induced by the economic 
and financial crisis, it is of growing importance to identify room for manoeuvre and appropriate 
measures to increase efficiency in the use of the funds allocated to the healthcare sector.  
  
Figure 1   Public health expenditure 
( % of GDP) 
Source: Our computations on data reported in Ministero dell'Economia e delle finanze,
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     1987-1991 14.8 8.6
     1992-1995 0.2 -4.3
1996-2010 5.9 3.7
Source: Our computations based on RGSEP, various years.
Real expenditure computed using CPI indices published by
Istat.  
                                                 
12  For  example,  regarding  the  hospital  sector,  Iuzzolino  (2008)  observes  that,  compared  with  the  other  OECD 
countries, Italy has a larger share of public hospitals of small size, probably because of poorer outpatient care and an 
unbalanced  allocation  of  resources  between  different  types  of  services.  This  is  reflected  in  the  unit  costs  of 
hospitalisation and the share of outlays for hospital in total spending, which are higher than the OECD average. 
13 For example, the last EPC report on the impact of ageing on public expenditure (EPC, 2009) projects healthcare 
and long-term care expenditure will increase, under the pure ageing scenario, by about 2.6 percentage points in terms 
of GDP by 2060.   9 
A descriptive analysis of the gap between expenditure levels among the different Italian regions 
and its determinants can be a useful starting point to detect possible inefficiencies and room for 
potential  savings.  The  Italian  regions  share  a  common  legal  framework  and  the  same  basic 
principles  (i.e.  universal  access  and  comprehensiveness)  but  operate  in  a  context  of 
administrative autonomy: each region can adopt, up to a certain extent, different organisational 
architectures (such as public/private mix, network of hospitals, etc.) and within limits vary the 
degree of financing through regional taxation and co-payments. A first glance at the per capita 
public current health expenditure highlights non-negligible variation among the Italian regions 
(see Figure 2a). However, it is possible to identify at least one cluster formed by the regions of 
the South, which generally have 1) lower than average per capita expenditure, and 2) higher 
growth rates. This might suggest convergent dynamics among the different areas of the country. 
Such findings seem to be confirmed by the estimate of the growth path of per capita health 
expenditure over the period 1996-2006 (see Figure 2b).
14  
 
Figure 2  Per capita public current health expenditure 
a) Geographical distribution in 2006 (euro) b) Growth path 1993-2006*
* Regions are represented by circles (in grey the southern ones) proportional to the population size.
Source: our computations based on RGSEP (various years)  
 
Figure 2b also depicts four quadrants centred on the national average growth rate and level of per 
capita expenditure. The picture suggests a clear pattern: while the regions in the Centre and North 
                                                 
14 In particular, we estimate the model  ( ) ( ) i i i Ex m g e + =
- 96 07 96 log , where gi is the average growth rate of per 
capita health expenditure of region i in the period 1996-2006, Exi
1996  is the value of per capita health expenditure in 
1996, and ei is a i.i.d. random variable with zero mean. In the estimate of m( ) we use the Nadaraya-Watson estimator 
with the optimal normal bandwidth (see Bowman and Azzalini, 1997, for more details). This preliminary estimation 
ignores cross-region heterogeneity. Estimates are computed using R.   10 
have higher levels of per capita health expenditure with respect to the national average, the South 
has higher growth rates. 
However, this evidence is questioned when adjusting expenditure to take into account patients’ 
mobility among regions and the different age structure of the population. In fact, spending in each 
region also reflects how many patients it attracts from other parts of the country
15 and how many 
elderly people need to be taken care of, given that a well-known stylised fact is the ‘u’ shape of 
the lifetime health costs profile where higher spending occurs when individuals are older.  
 
Figure 3  Per capita public current health expenditure  
adjusted for patients’ mobility and age structure of the population  
a) Geographical distribution in 2006 (euro) b) Growth path 1993-2006*
* Regions are represented by circles (in grey the Southern ones) proportional to the population size.
Source: our computations based on RGSEP (various years) for expenditure and mobility balances, Istat for the population
composition and Ministero della Salute (2007) for coefficients used to compute the equivalent population.  
In particular, we observe that many southern patients travel to the Centre and North for medical 
care so that per capita spending for residents in the northern regions is higher than spending per 
treated person. This pattern is stable over time. Furthermore, as to the impact of the age structure, 
on  average  southern  regions  have  a  younger  population.  We  therefore  adjust  per  capita 
expenditure to take into account these two features.
16 In this case, per capita expenditure appears 
                                                 
15 Patients’ mobility among regions is allowed under the national public healthcare system: healthcare costs are 
covered by the SSN independently of the region actually providing the service.  
16  In  order  to  compute  per  capita  public  current  health  expenditure  adjusted  for  patients’  mobility  and  the  age 
structure of the population we have used population data (broken down by region and age) and the coefficients 
published by Ministero della Salute (2007), which capture differences in the consumption of pharmaceuticals and 
hospital  services  between  individuals  at  different  ages.  The  equivalent  population  has  been  obtained  using  the 
equation:    11 
to be higher on average in the South. Moreover, variability increases across the country and data 
do not support the hypothesis of any convergence in the expenditure pattern (see Figure 3). 
 
3.  Regional differentials in health expenditure: are there saving margins? 
3.1 The model 
This section presents the model from which we derive the estimating equations. We consider a 
benevolent regional government (i) which wants to maximise the following: 
(1)  
h,u g x x (x) U x U
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h is the utility gained by a healthy individual from the consumption of healthcare (x) and U
i
u is 
the  utility  gained  by  sick  individuals; 
i
h x   and 
i
u x   are  the  quantities  of  healthcare  consumed 
respectively by a healthy and a sick individual in region i; p is the fraction of healthy individuals 
in the region and 1-p the fraction of sick ones;  i K is a vector of economic, social, demographic 
and health status characteristics that affect both the probability of being sick and the preference 
structure for the consumption of healthcare. We assume that the budget constraint is either not 
binding
17 or that the regional government can draw additional resources from the citizens resident 
in the region to finance the production of the optimal/desired health spending. 
The optimal level of healthcare provision is then:
  









u* solve problem (1).  
Given the cost function Ct(x), assumed to be the same in all regions, in each period t per capita 
public health expenditure will be: 
(3)     i w K x C s i it it t it " + =           )) ( * (  
























E is the equivalent population of region i, Pji is the population of region i in the age class j, aj is the 
coefficient relative to age class j, A is the total number of age classes (101), N is the number of regions (21). We have 
then adjusted expenditure to take into account population mobility and finally computed spending per capita values. 
We  thank  Demetrio  Alampi  for  having  suggested  where  to  retrieve  the  information  necessary  to  work  out  the 
equivalent population.   
17 This assumption is consisent with the literature on soft budget constraints (Bordignon and Turati, 2003) and with 
the evidence of systematic spending overruns and deficits in the health sector.     12 
where wi (‘waste’) captures the distance of region i with respect to the cost frontier.
18 Assuming 
that  each  region’s  relative  inefficiency  is  invariant  over  time,  we  can  derive  the  following 
estimating equation for per capita spending: 
(4)    it it i it w s e b a + + + = ' k  
with 
ε
it being the error term. 
This  framework  assumes  that  under  different  financing  settings  (i.e.  resources  drawn  from  a 
central budget or through local taxation) the regional  governments would anyway be  able to 
finance spending  it s , hence ensuring the production of  * it x , whatever the region’s fiscal capacity 
and efficiency level.  
For this to be possible:  
1) the objective of the central government (CG) must be to ensure the provision of  * i x ; 
2) CG must be able to collect enough resources to finance the production of  * i x  in all the 
regions; 
3) CG and the regions must observe spending levels and the composition of financing but 
not distinguish efficient technology from waste levels  ) ( i w . 
In a setting where the above conditions hold and where healthcare is financed both via transfers 
received  from  the  central  government  and  using  revenue  from  local  taxes,  regions  have  the 
incentive to set the latter at the minimum if they believe that the CG will cover the remaining 
costs. In such a framework each region will be able to produce  * i x  and tax revenue collected by 
CG in rich regions will be used to finance spending in poor ones as well. Tax rates at local level 
will  be  correlated  neither  with  efficiency  in  the  production  of  healthcare  nor  with  income 
differentials. 
A similar framework, where the CG announces fixed flat transfers but only some regions believe 
in its commitment, will have an analogous outcome. Ex post, CG will find that to stick to its 
commitment is not optimal (otherwise in some regions it will not be possible to produce  * i x ) and 
low local tax rates will not necessarily reflect high productive efficiency. They could also be due 
to regional beliefs (about the lack of credibility of CG commitment) or low demand levels. Again 
the ranking of regions according to the level of local tax rates will not necessarily reflect the 
                                                 
18 wi can be interpreted as the cost of inefficiency for region i.   13 
ranking  in  productive  efficiency.  In  this  set  up  regions  that  overspend  with  respect  to  the 
resources set by the central government are not necessarily the most inefficient ones.
19 
The  empirical  analysis  in  the  following  paragraph  then  moves  forward  to  the  estimation  of 
equation (4) disregarding fiscal capacity, local taxation or regional deficit indicators. The aim 
being in the first step to infer differentials in spending among regions (wi) which are not related to 
structural differences in the demand for healthcare ( b a it ' k + ) and in the second step to analyse 
the possible drivers of such gaps.  
3.2 The empirical analysis – first step: the impact of demand factors  
The first step considers regional per capita spending levels and their determinants in order to 
control for the forces that lie behind the observed dynamics of outlays embedded in the demand 
structure (such as demography, education, etc.) which can be assumed, at least in the short and 
medium term, to be independent of healthcare policies. 
The empirical analysis at the international level has pinpointed the correlations between health 
spending levels and demand factors such as income, the demographic structure and the health 
status of the population (Newhouse, 1977; Gerdtham et al., 1998; Gerdtham and Jonsson, 2000). 
Usually, most of the empirical literature also controls for labour market and education indicators 
or variables capturing institutional differences between healthcare systems.
20 
 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real per capita health expenditure (corrected for mobility) 294 1,222 203 884 1,810
Real per capita health expenditure (corrected for mobility and structure of the population) 294 1,283 214 923 2,030
Real per capita GDP 294 19,818 5,102 10,836 28,504
Dependency ratio for children (0-4) 294 21.22 3.66 15.05 30.22
Dependency ratio for elderly (75+) 294 12.36 3.02 6.38 21.08
Life expectancy (female) 294 82.38 1.28 78.87 85.00
Bad habit
alcohol 294 7.02 2.55 3.65 11.92
wine 294 5.72 1.49 2.12 8.94
smoke 294 23.50 2.47 17.33 30.68
Health status
high blood pressure 294 125.32 22.42 75.10 179.20
heart attack 294 14.62 3.79 6.90 24.80
angina 294 8.51 2.80 3.90 17.60
other heart deseases 294 33.70 5.18 22.90 49.70
diabetes 294 40.34 8.49 19.20 57.90
ictus 294 11.43 2.69 6.80 18.50
malignant cancer (males) 294 21.84 6.97 9.84 38.67
malignant cancer (females) 294 26.25 8.61 11.71 47.75
Participation rate (female) 294 40.81 11.15 18.82 61.54
Tertiary Education 294 7.64 2.16 3.65 14.20
Share of employed in agriculture (%) 294 7.28 4.05 1.53 21.43
Share of employed in manufacturing (%) 294 29.56 6.96 17.96 43.97 
                                                 
19 For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the financing mechanism in our framework see Appendix A. 
20 In our analysis we do not include the latter variables as the regions share a common institutional framework.   14 
We use a similar approach to investigate regional per capita spending levels and in turn identify 
“unexplained” differentials. We use a panel of the 21 Italian regions for 14 years (1993-2006), 
which includes variables on per capita health expenditure and its breakdown,
21 per capita GDP,
 22 
health status indicators,
23 variables relating to the labour market and education
24 (for descriptive 
statistics see Table 2). 
In particular, we estimate the following semilog expenditure model:
25 
(5)   ln(rexp_pcit)= a+g(i) + xit' b  + eit 
where rexp_pcit is the real per capita expenditure observed in region i at time t, g(i) are the region 
specific effects that we initially assume to be composed of fixed effects,
26 i.e. g(i) =ai, and x 
includes: real per capita GDP; the dependency ratios of the elderly and children, to capture the U-
shape of the age-expenditure profile; female life expectancy and a proxy for the health status of 
the population (this proxy takes into account the incidence series for the following conditions: 
high blood pressure, heart attack, angina, other heart diseases, diabetes, ictus, together with male 
and female prevalence rates for malignant cancer); a proxy
27 for habits that affect health (such as 
tobacco and alcohol);
28 the female employment rate, as an indicator for the provision of informal 
care; the level of education (percentage of people with at least a bachelor degree); proxies for the 
regions’ development measured as the percentage of employees respectively in agriculture and in 
manufacturing.  
We also consider a time specific effect in order to separate the years before and after 1995.
29 As 
said above, the first half of the 1990s was a period of exceptional expenditure  containment, 
achieved mainly through spending postponements and generalised cuts at the national level in 
                                                 
21 Expenditure data are derived from Ministero dell’Economia e delle finanze (various years). 
22 Regional GDP is published by Istat (2007 and 2008).  
23 Health status indicators are drawn form the databases published by Istat (2009). 
24 Data on labour market participation, employment rates and education levels of the population (broken down by 
region and sex) have been computed using individual data provided by Istat (see Istat, Rilevazione sulle forze di 
lavoro). We thank Federico Giorgi for having provided such computations. 
25 The specification used reflects the nature of the regressors. All of them, apart from per capita GDP are ratios or 
dummies.  
26 An alternative estimation strategy would be to implement a multilevel model which simultaneously considers both 
the first and the second step. Even though this procedure could be more efficient, it has two main drawbacks: 1) it 
requires stronger distributional assumptions on the error terms; 2) it would make it less straightforward to work out 
an estimate of the inefficiency levels and decompose and analyse them as reported in the following paragraph. We 
have estimated such a model as a robustenss check, however; estimated coefficients of the variables from the first 
and the second step and their significance are in line with those obtained following a two-step procedure.  
27 Both the proxies for the health status and ‘bad’ habits are obtained via a principal component analysis (see  
Table 3), which allows us to reduce the dimension of the set of regressors and exploit the correlation among the 
variables.  
28 In particular, the following are taken into account: the share of smokers (variable ‘smoke’), the share of the 
population drinking at least half a litre of wine a day (variable ‘wine’) and the share of those who drink alcohol at 
least twice a week (variable ‘alcohol’). 
29 In particular, we include a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years after 1995.   15 
view of the need to contain government deficits and favour adjustment to meet the Maastricht 
parameters. Finally, eit is the error term. 
In  particular,  we  consider  three  specifications  (Table  4),  which  simply  differ  as  to  the 
denominator used to compute the dependent variable (population, equivalent population for the 
consumption  of  hospital  services  or  equivalent  population  for  the  consumption  of 
pharmaceuticals  –  see  footnote  16  –  in  the  latter  cases  the  variables  accounting  for  the 
demographic structure of the population are not included among the regressors). We estimate (5) 
using a panel fixed effect estimator. 
 
Table 3  – Principal component analysis 
a - 'Bad' habit





Variable 1 2 3
alcohol 0.7091 -0.3333 0.6213
wine 0.7050 0.3445 -0.6199
smoke -0.0074 0.8776 0.4793
b - Health status










Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
high blood pressure 0.4919 -0.0908 0.1407 0.0192 0.4545 0.0011 -0.7223 -0.0363
heart attack 0.4062 0.0853 0.1948 -0.5873 -0.6186 0.2274 -0.1013 0.012
angina 0.0858 0.5692 -0.3986 -0.0022 0.2466 0.6654 0.063 0.047
other heart deseases 0.2433 0.5693 -0.089 -0.2872 0.2052 -0.6673 0.1972 0.0001
diabetes 0.2242 -0.0076 0.7149 0.0236 0.3487 0.2289 0.5138 -0.0106
ictus 0.3096 0.3514 0.1558 0.7492 -0.431 -0.079 -0.0537 -0.0128
malignant cancer (males) 0.4399 -0.3397 -0.3178 0.0823 0.0208 -0.0392 0.2596 0.7169






30 are broadly in line with those generally found in the literature on international health 
expenditure  comparisons  (Gerdtham  et  al.,  1998;  Gerdtham  and  Jönsson,  2000).  Per  capita 
                                                 
30 Since the modified Wald suggests the presence of heteroskedasticity and the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data (Wooldridge, 2002; Drukker, 2003) does reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation, the 
standard errors estimator used is robust to both hetoreskedasticity and serial correlation.   16 
expenditure  is  positively  correlated  with  income  (even  though  the  variable  is  not  always 
significant) as well as with life expectancy. As for labour market indicators, we consider female 
employment rates, since the more women are employed in the labour market the more often 
formal care substitutes informal care that is provided within the household (and thus the higher is 
the demand for formal healthcare). However, the employment rate turns out to be not statistically 
significant. 
Table 4  Step 1 – Panel estimation with fixed effects 
(standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Per capita GDP 0.00001 0.248 0.00001 0.436 0.00002 * 0.078
Dependency ratio for children (0-4) -0.00645 0.279
Dependency ratio for elderly (75+) 0.04337 *** 0.010
Life expectancy (female) 0.04133 *** 0.003 0.05461 *** 0.000 0.05890 *** 0.000
Bad habit 0.02172 ** 0.015 0.02645 *** 0.002 0.01479 * 0.066
Health status 0.01763 *** 0.008 0.03100 *** 0.000 0.02298 *** 0.000
Participation rate (female) 0.00154 0.703 0.00559 0.150 0.00544 0.181
Tertiary education 0.00317 0.575 0.01234 0.178 0.01393 0.135
Share of employed in agriculture (%) -0.00678 * 0.089 -0.00986 ** 0.045 -0.01121 ** 0.020
Share of employed in manufacturing (%) 0.00127 0.254 0.00211 * 0.078 0.00216 * 0.075
Dummy for the years after 1995 -0.11747 *** 0.000 -0.09603 *** 0.000 -0.11564 *** 0.000
Constant 3.11231 *** 0.003 2.28089 ** 0.012 1.72265 * 0.051
No. Observations 294 294 294
F( 11,    20) 115.76 123.72 123.96
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.9304 0.9239 0.9244
Adj R-squared 0.9222 0.9156 0.9161
Root MSE 0.0453 0.0462 0.0477
Regional fixed effects (       i)
1 Piemonte -0.144  -0.170  -0.175 
2 Valle d'Aosta 0.065 0.056 0.007
3 Lombardia -0.135  -0.230  -0.286 
4 Bolzano 0.263 0.221 0.152
5 Trento -0.034  -0.071  -0.108 
6 Veneto -0.131  -0.199  -0.214 
7 Friuli Venezia Giulia -0.251  -0.252  -0.233 
8 Liguria -0.270  -0.201  -0.159 
9 Emilia Romagna -0.278  -0.305  -0.303 
10 Toscana -0.260  -0.254  -0.249 
11 Umbria -0.245  -0.261  -0.221 
12 Marche -0.227  -0.259  -0.242 
13 Lazio 0.104 0.045 -0.000 
14 Abruzzo -0.034  -0.018  -0.004 
15 Molise 0.017 0.079 0.123
16 Campania 0.412 0.434 0.437
17 Puglia 0.259 0.304 0.315
18 Basilicata 0.139 0.188 0.223
19 Calabria 0.223 0.259 0.300
20 Sicilia 0.285 0.352 0.372
21 Sardegna 0.243 0.280 0.266
 (1) using weights for hospital services; (2) using weights for pharmaceutical consumption
*, **, *** significance at respectively 10, 5 and 1 per cent level
(Model 3a)
Real total expenditure 
(corrected to take into 
account patient mobility and 
adjusted for equivalent 
population (2))
(Model 1a)
Real total expenditure 
(corrected to take into 
account patient mobility)
(Model 2a)
Real total expenditure 
(corrected to take into 
account patient mobility and 
adjusted for equivalent 
population (1))
 
The dependency ratios for children (0-4 years old) and for the elderly (75 years of age or older) 
allow us to capture the effect of the age structure of the population. The age profile of per capita 
expenditure highlights how the demand for healthcare is greater at very young ages and for older 
age cohorts (Jacobzone, 2002; EPC, 2006). The results are partially unexpected: while the elderly 
dependency ratio has a positive and significant sign, the dependency ratio of the very young is   17 
not significant. This finding may be driven by considering too broad an age class (0-4 years of 
age)  as  the  expenditure  profile  is  higher  at  younger  ages,  particularly  in  infancy  or  early 
childhood (Cutler and Meara, 1997). 
The  health  status  and  bad  habit  indicators  are  both  significant  and  have  the  expected  sign 
(‘poorer’ health and ‘worse’ habits are associated with higher expenditure).  
The dummy variable aimed at capturing the general cost containment effort exerted in the first 
part of the 1990s is highly significant and has the expected sign (the intercept of the expenditure 
curve is shifted downwards after 1995). 
Regional fixed effects are shown in the lower panel of Table 4. They are strongly consistent 
between the three specifications, with the correlations among the series ranging from 0.95 to 
0.99. 
3.3 First step: robustness checks  
To check the robustness of our estimates we perform a series of exercises described in Appendix 
B.  First,  we  re-estimate  the  three  specifications  discussed  above  using  different  indices  for 
computing real values for per capita health expenditure and GDP. Secondly, we re-estimate the 
model using a stochastic frontier approach. We consider both time invariant and time varying 
specifications. All of the estimated models give very similar results; the correlation between the 
estimated regional effects series ranges between 0.95 and 1. The time varying models, in which 
unexplained expenditure is a function of time, indicate that, other things being equal, differentials 
in spending between regions are increasing over time, i.e. more efficient regions are also at an 
advantage to contain expenditure growth (not only levels).  
Following  a  similar  approach  to  Schmidt  and  Sickles  (1984),  we  approximate  ‘waste’  (or 
unexplained differentials) for each region with the estimated fixed effects, that is i i w a ˆ ˆ = . In this 
way, however, any time invariant heterogeneity between the regions is also captured by the waste 
term.
31 Even though we acknowledge this identification issue, we also believe that it is not as 
relevant in this study as in other applications. In particular, the common legal and institutional 
framework  and  the  shared rules  set  at  the  central  level  significantly  mitigate  the  problem  of 
heterogeneity among regions potentially associated with institutional factors. Secondly, at this 
stage we are interested in isolating unexplained (by demand factors) differentials whatever the 
source might be (time invariant heterogeneity or ‘technical’ inefficiency). In the second step of 
                                                 
31 See Greene (2004), (2005) and (2008).        18 
the analysis we will try to see whether the waste levels are correlated with indicators aimed at 
capturing the quality of the public administration or other exogenous regional characteristics. 
3.4 First step: a disaggregated analysis by spending category and the relation to quality 
Before moving to the second step we estimate regional fixed effects using (5) (according to the 
specification adopted for Model 1a) also breaking down the dependent variable into its main sub-
categories. We consider two types of breakdown: (i) the first by economic category (in which we 
distinguish  between  wages,  purchases  of  goods  and  services,  spending  for  private  hospitals 
recognised  within  the  SSN,  primary  care,  pharmaceuticals,  and  specialised  care)
32  and  (ii)  a 
second one in which we group together wages, purchases of goods and services and spending to 
reimburse private hospitals to proxy overall public spending for hospital services.  
Given  the  estimates  for  each  expenditure  category  we  can  recover aggregate  regional  ‘waste 
levels’. Assuming that each expenditure item h presents a relationship as in (5) and using the 
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The distance to the minimum cost for each region i can be represented as a weighted average of 




i x , with the latter normalised with respect to 
the minimum total regional effect. Estimated fixed effects obtained by aggregating the results for 
the expenditure items are in line with those obtained estimating aggregate expenditure.
33 Figure 4 
shows for each region the contribution of each expenditure item to the difference between its own 
inefficiency score and the minimum one  ) ( min x x - i .
34  
                                                 
32 As to the magnitude of the expenditure categories considered, it should be noted that in 2005 for the Italian 
average, wages accounted for 33 per cent of total expenditure, the purchase of goods and services for 27 per cent, 
primary care for 6 per cent, pharmaceuticals for 13 per cent, private hospital care for 9 per cent, and specialised care 
for 4 per cent.   
33 Given (7), regional effects can be obtained by aggregating the results of the estimation of the expenditure items 
















  ln ˆ
a a . The correlation between  i a ˆ and  disag i  ˆ a is 0.99 using both the expenditure 
breakdowns described above. 
34 The difference can be decomposed as follows:   19 
Figure 4  
Regional fixed effects: breakdown of deviation with respect to  
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= are the contributions of each expenditure item and variables with the subscipt min refer to the 
region with the lowest ai. Values shown in Figure 4 are computed considering the average values of 
h
i s over the 
estimated period.    20 
Figure 5 instead shows the contribution of each expenditure item to the difference between the 







Figure 5  
Regional fixed effects: breakdown of deviation with respect  
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35 If  h
h
i " =   1
~
x (the term of comparison this time is the case in which inefficiency is uniformly distributed among 




i s = k .  It  follows  that  the  described 
difference can be decomposed as:  ∑ ∑
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) (k x x .    21 
This decomposition allows us to point out some interesting patterns. Low levels of unexplained 
expenditure (characterised by  i D  equal or close to 0) seem compatible with different choices as 
regards spending composition. Furthermore, in regions with higher spending the distribution of 
inefficiency among expenditure items does not seem to be uniform. In particular, in the regions 
with  a  positive total  fixed  effect  (meaning, ceteris  paribus,  higher  than  average  unexplained 
expenditure), the management of the outlays which account for relatively smaller shares of the 
budget  seems  in  need  of  particularly  careful  monitoring.  This  is  evident  if  we  consider  the 











J , an indicator 
that compares the share of the deviation from minimum spending due to a given expenditure item 
and the reference share of that same item in total outlays (Figure 6).
36 For the regions with a 
positive  total  fixed  effect  located  in  the  South  of  Italy  the  distortion  in  spending  on 
pharmaceuticals is particularly large, while the weight of the inefficiency in hospital spending is 
less pronounced than implied by their reference share of total spending.
37 This might reflect 
several features, such as national guidelines and the application of national labour contracts for 
the employees of the SSN. The breakdown of hospital spending suggests that in some regions, in 
particular  Lazio,  the  level  of  distortion  in  reimbursements  for  services  provided  by  private 
hospitals plays a non-negligible role in overall spending overruns. For the northern regions with 
higher than average unexplained expenditure (Valle d’Aosta and the autonomous province of 
                                                 
36 Taken a region i, values of 
h
i J that are close to zero for every h suggest that in region i the level of inefficiency is 
similar among the various expenditure items. A large value of 
h




 for that item with respect to the others. We can in fact rewrite 
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x x then  h
h
i " =    0 q . All the items have the same level of inefficiency. The distortion might be 
very big but it is uniformly distributed among the expenditure items. On the other hand, consider a case in which all 
the  first  h-1  items  are  characterised  by  ‘full  efficiency’  so  that  1 ,..., 1    1
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i q while  the  overall  inefficiency  will  reflect  the 
distortion in the last expenditure item: 
H
i q will be  1 ,..., 1    0 - = " > > H h
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i q x x > will be positive, 




i q x x < will be negative. This means that a large distortion in a relatively small spending item might 
be compensated by a relatively smaller distortion in a spending item that accounts for a large fraction of total outlays.  
37 This means that for the regions under consideration the inefficiency level for this item, although large, is less 
pronounced than the inefficiency in other spending categories.     22 
Bolzano)  the  situation  is  different,  with  most  of  the  distortion  being  attributable  to  hospital 
spending.  
Figure 6  
q q q qi
h: share of the deviation from minimum spending due to a given  
expenditure item (h) minus its weight on total outlays 
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The particular geographic characteristics of these regions, both located in the Alps, might play a 
role. As regards the distortion in the purchases of goods and services, it seems in line with 
average inefficiency levels in each of the regions. For this item the large impact on overall 
unexplained spending (Figure 5) seems to reflect mainly its large incidence on total expenditure.   23 
It  has  to  be  noted,  however,  that  regions  with  lower  health  spending  seem  to  have  been 
particularly effective in containing outlays in this category. 
An  overall  glance  at  the  results  highlights  a  clear  geographical  pattern:
38  the  regions  which 
present positive unexplained differentials are all located in the South of the country, apart from 
Valle d’Aosta and the autonomous province of Bolzano in the North and Lazio in the Centre. 
Also in light of the identification problem discussed above, before moving on to disentangle 
some of the characteristics that might be related to the regional fixed effects, it is worth checking 
whether the differentials isolated in our first step reflect differences in the quality of services 
provided to the public. To do that we consider two types of indicators: a) the mobility of patients 
between regions; b) declared patients’ satisfaction. 
If we look at patients’ mobility between regions
39 (Figure 7) as an indirect indicator of the quality 
of health services (or at least of the degree of quality ‘perceived’ by patients), we observe that 
patients consistently tend to move from the South towards the Centre and North of Italy. The 
correlation between the regional fixed effects and the average attraction index observed over the 
period considered is highly negative (-0.64) and significant so that the higher the ‘perceived’ 
quality, the lower the ‘unexplained’ spending. 
Similarly, indicators that take into account declared patient satisfaction
40 for hospital services 
display a clear North-South pattern with patients being more satisfied with hospital services in the 
North.  In  particular,  the  correlation  between  average  patient  satisfaction  indexes  for  nurses, 
physicians and sanitary services and the estimated regional effects vary between -0.48 and -0.31. 
Finally, the complexity of the treatments is also on average higher in the regions with lower 
regional effects.
41  
In brief, the higher spending in the southern regions with respect to the Centre and North does not 
seem to be ascribable to perceived or reported higher quality. So, what causes the difference? Are 
there any factors that policy makers could control for in order to cut spending without reducing 
the amount of services provided? 
 
                                                 
38 This result is in line with other studies that have addressed the analysis of health spending differentials. See for 
example Pammolli, Papa and Salerno (2009).  
39 In particular, we consider 
 the attraction index, measured as the ratio between the inflow and outflow of patients 
into a given region. An index value > 1 means that the inflow of patients from other regions is greater than the 
outflow to other regions, and hence the region attracts patients from other areas of the country. 
40  The  satisfaction  with  hospital  services  is  drawn  from  surveys  included  in  the  Indagine  multiscopo  regularly 
performed by Istat. The data considered here refer to the period 1998-2007. 
41 The correlation between the average case mix (measured as the standard hospital stay*the normalised applicable 
DRG) over the observed period and regional fixed effects is -0.89.    24 
Figure 7  Attraction Index(*)   
(Net mobility) 
(*) A value greater than 1 means that the inflow of patients from other regions is greater than the outflow of residents towards other
regions. 
Source: our computations based on Ministero della Salute, Rapporto sull’attività di ricovero ospedaliero, and Istat, Statistiche sulla
sanità, various years. Data up to 1995 refer to all hospital admissions. For the following years they refer to ordinary admissions, escluding 











3.5 The empirical analysis – second step: the drivers of regional differentials  
The  second  step  of  our  analysis  tries  to  address  this  issue.  In  particular,  we  investigate  the 
correlation between regional effects and some supply factors and regional characteristics which 
could influence the unexplained variability observed in spending levels. 
The analysis exploits the result of the expenditure levels estimation in step one. In particular, we 
consider the covariates of the regional fixed effects estimating the following linear model:
42 
(8)  N i i i i ,..., 1            = + ¢ = z d a q  
where  i z is the standard i.i.d. error term and  i q is a vector of j regressors and includes indicators 
for  the  following  categories:  1)  appropriateness  of  treatments;
43  2)  supply  structure 
characteristics;
44 3) quality in public administration;
45 and 4) social capital.
46  
                                                 
42 This is consistent with the assumption of regional effects being time invariant. As seen above, the time invariant 
component estimated using time varying frontier models or fixed effects gives equivalent results. Apart from the 
common impact due to the decaying factor, estimated waste levels are strongly correlated using the four estimation 
procedures discussed in Appendix B.  
43  The  indicators  considered  under  this  category  are  the  average  over  the  observed  period  of  the  incidence  of 
Caesarian sections and of the incidence of patients discharged by a surgical ward with a medical DRG. 
44 In this category we considered the averages of the incidence of SSN employees on residents; composition of 
employees (ratio of medical staff over total employees); incidences of public hospital beds on residents; incidences   25 
Given the small number of observations, we started by considering one (or at most two) regressor 
for  each  category:  the  index  for  Caesarean  sections,  the  index  for  total  employment  and  its 
composition; the indicator for general practitioners with a large number of patients; the ratio 
between the number of beds in private and public hospitals; the share of the use of generic 
pharmaceuticals and proxies for social capital (Table 5 shows the results of the estimation). To 
check the robustness of the results, we also considered each category at a time and substituted the 
proxy/ies included in the estimated specification. Table 5 also shows the results of a SURE model 
having as dependent variables the regional effects for the categories of hospital spending, primary 
care, outlays for pharmaceuticals and specialised care.
47 
The  appropriateness  index  turns  out  to  be  significantly  related  to  unexplained  spending 
differentials  (even  when  we  substitute  Caesarean  sections  with  the  surgical  ward  discharge 
index
48). The higher the inappropriateness of treatments the higher the regional effects.  
As to supply indicators, a higher number of employees is related to higher spending, as expected. 
Instead, the coefficient of the proxy for the composition of the staff is not significant. 
The workload of general practitioners is significant;
49 in particular, the share of practitioners with 
a very large number of patients is related to higher spending (the same happens when considering 
the average number of patients for general practitioners). The workload of primary care doctors 
has a strong positive impact on hospital and pharmaceutical spending as well as spending for 
primary care. This suggests that too many patients to follow might make it more difficult for 
general practitioners to avoid unnecessary access to hospital services and use of pharmaceuticals. 
                                                                                                                                                              
of private hospital beds; ratio between number of beds in private to public hospitals; share of expenditure for care 
provided by private hospitals; average stay in public hospitals; average stay in private hospitals; number of general 
pratictioners;  number of patients per general pratictioner; number of  general pratictioners  with  more than 1500 
patients.  
45 To proxy the quality of administration we consider indicators of some practices that aim to reduce the resources 
absorbed by pharmaceutical outlays without reducing the quantity provided or the effectiveness of the treatments: the 
share  of  pharmaceutical  expenditure  for  generic  (off-patent)  pharmaceuticals  and  the  share  of  expenditure  for 
pharmaceuticals delivered directly by the SSN in total pharmaceutical expenditure. We also considered an indicator 
for the use of IT in other Italian local governments in each region; in particular, we use a municipality IT index, 
which is given by the share of municipalities whose general registry office has been computerised. 
46 In particular, we consider several proxies for social capital commonly used in the literature: incidence of blood 
donors per 1000 residents; incidence of recyclable waste collection (we thank Marco Casiraghi for providing these 
indicators); average turnout at referenda; interest in politics and morality. The indicators for solidarity/‘morality’ and 
participation/‘interest  in politics’ are drawn  from Giordano et al. (2009). In particular, solidarity/‘morality’ is  a 
composite index summarising self-reported pro-social attitudes and objective measures of altruistic behaviour (such 
as blood donation); similarly, interest in politics is built from self-reported answers and more objective measures 
(such as referendum participation).   
47  All  the  estimated  models  exclude  the  constant  term.  In  fact,  the  mean  value  of  the  fixed  effects  is  zero  by 
construction. To check for this, however, we also replicate the estimation including the constant term, which turns 
out to be not significant. Moreover, neither the sign nor the magnitute of the estimated coefficients are affected by 
including/excluding the constant.  
48 In this case, however, it interferes with the significance of the number of employees indicator. 







































Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
% Caesarian sections 0.01793 *** 0.000 0.01025 *** 0.000 0.00170 *** 0.000 0.00334 *** 0.000 0.00101 ** 0.027
Incidence of SSN employees on residents 0.04854 *** 0.002 0.04889 *** 0.000 0.00508 *** 0.000 0.00461 * 0.061 -0.00070 0.731
Composition of employees (medical staff/employees) -0.00657 0.232 0.00427 0.252 -0.00003 0.954 0.00174 * 0.092 0.00009 0.918
General pratictioners with more than 1500 patients 0.00877 *** 0.000 0.00758 *** 0.000 0.00044 *** 0.003 0.00055 ** 0.035 0.00014 0.504
# beds in private/# bed in public hospitals 0.00214 0.137 0.00161 * 0.095 0.00034 ** 0.020 0.00059 ** 0.029 0.00034 0.124
% generic (off patent) pharmaceuticals -0.05452 *** 0.004 -0.03993 *** 0.001 -0.00166 0.316 -0.00615 ** 0.044 -0.00243 0.334
Interest in politics -0.01551 *** 0.001 -0.01143 *** 0.000 -0.00140 *** 0.000 -0.00269 *** 0.000 -0.00080 0.156
Solidarity 0.00805 ** 0.018 0.00791 *** 0.000 0.00053 * 0.100 0.00117 ** 0.048 0.00094 * 0.058
No. Observations 21 21 21 21 21
F( 8, 13) 22.07 559.14 184.66 244.2 20.15
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
r2 y,
ŷ
0.9332 0.9971 0.9913 0.9934 0.9254




*, **, *** significance at respectively 10, 5 and 1 per cent level
(1) Ordinary least square.
(2) Maximum likelihood seemingly unrelated regression. Small sample statistics are computed.
Regional fixed effect (2)
total expenditure hospital expenditure primary care pharmaceuticals specialised care










Table 5 Step 2 – Drivers of regional effects
0.53 0.34 0.62 1.00
0.49 0.58 1.00  27 
Proxies (either the ratio of beds in private to public hospitals or the share of spending for private 
hospitals in total spending) for the relevance of the private sector display a positive but not 
significant  coefficient  in  the  regression  for  aggregate  regional  effects;  the  coefficient  is 
significant, however, in the estimation of spending categories, in particular hospitals, primary 
care and pharmaceuticals. The impact of a larger role for the private sector could be relevant, but 
our  aggregate  analysis  is  not  able  to  highlight  it.  This  could  be  due  to  the  relation  that 
characterises the relevance of the private sector and some of the other control variables.
50 
As expected, proxies for good practices (we considered alternatively the index for the use of 
generics or for direct delivery of pharmaceuticals) do display a negative relation to unexplained 
spending.  
Finally, we also included in our model proxies for informal rules and habits that might play a role 
in the performances of different public administrations. The economic literature often highlights 
the  impact  of  history  and  economic  institutions  on  the  development  of  different  regions. 
Institutions also include informal rules and constraints which are often summarised in the concept 
of  social  capital.
51  In  this  context,  social  capital  captures  the  level  of  trust  and  habits  of 
cooperation  shared  among  members  of  a  local  community.  As  to  our  results,  social  capital 
indicators turn out to be significant when splitting the two aspects of solidarity/‘morality’ and 
participation/‘interest in politics’, the first one being positively related to spending – probably 
reflecting a higher propensity to share fundamental services – the second one being negatively 
related to regional effects – suggesting that the more public attention is given to policy makers’ 
activity the stronger their incentive to manage the available resources efficiently. 
Although  the  second  step  of  the  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  small  sample  size,  the 
correlations  we  detect  are  sufficiently  robust  to  derive  some  general  policy  considerations. 
Regional spending differentials seem to be related both to persistent (sticky?) regional features 
(such as social capital) and characteristics which in the medium term can be controlled by policy 
makers (such as the appropriateness of health treatments, the workload of general practitioners or 
the  use  of  generics).  Spreading  administrative  best  practices  and  enhancing  the  degree  of 
appropriateness of treatments would be an effective way of reducing spending differentials and 
increasing efficiency in the use of public funds. Even relatively limited improvements could turn 
into substantial savings: given our results, an increase in the appropriateness level or in the use of 
                                                 
50  For  example,  the  correlation  between  our  regressor  for  inappropriateness  (Caesarean  sections)  and  the  ratio 
between the number of beds in private and public hospitals is positive (0.43). Furthermore, a more prominent role of 
the private sector is also reflected ceteris paribus in a lower number of employees in the public sector.   
51 See Putnam (1993), de Blasio and Nuzzo (2006), Nuzzo (2006). 28 
generics by 1 percentage point
52 implies on average a reduction of respectively 1.8 and 5.3 per 
cent in total expenditure (€20.9 and €62.3 per capita).  
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
Several studies have documented the presence of regional differentials in public health spending 
in Italy. The aim of this work is to contribute to this discussion by analysing the determinants of 
per capita health expenditure focusing on identifying the drivers of inefficiency for the panel of 
Italian regions and the existence of potential room for savings. The paper presents an empirical 
analysis of per capita expenditure levels that takes into account the regional differences in the 
need for health services. The remaining differences in spending (the “unexplained differentials”) 
are then studied in relation to structural characteristics and policy variables.  
First, the results confirm the existence of potential margins for savings which are related at least 
in part to differences in the effectiveness of public administration. However, with respect to 
previous studies, our methodology not only allows us to evaluate the overall inefficiency level for 
every  region,  but  also  to  estimate  the  contribution  of  each  spending  item  (e.g.  wages, 
pharmaceuticals, etc.) to that inefficiency. For all the regions, the analysis further breaks it down 
into two factors: the first accounts for the budget share of each spending category, the second 
captures its relative inefficiency. In our framework it is thus possible to single out the categories 
which  need  careful  monitoring  in  the  regions  with  poorer  performances,  such  as  outlays  for 
pharmaceuticals. 
The second step of the study suggests that there are policy tools (e.g. the use of generic drugs or 
the  workload  of  general  practitioners)  that  might  help  to  keep  inefficiency  under  control. 
Moreover, some supply structure indicators and proxies for good practices seem to be particularly 
important for certain spending categories. 
 
Appendix A: The impact of different hypotheses on the financing mechanisms 
A.1 Ex post bail-out 
Let us consider a one period economy with N regions. Each region has a given income level (and 





 is the total income in the economy (and the overall tax base).  
                                                 
52 These computations use the result of the estimation of Model 1a in Table 4 and the coefficents reported in the first 
column of Table 5. Values are computed using variable averages over the regions and the years 1993-2006.        29 
Healthcare  is  financed  via  transfers  received  from  the  central  government  (CG)  and  using 
regional resources. Each region can decide on the level of a local tax  0 ³ i n . Regions want to 
produce the optimal level of healthcare demanded by the population ( * i x ) and choose the local 
tax rate accordingly. They also want to minimise the tax burden on the citizens living in their 
constituency and know that: (1) the CG will choose a level of general taxation (t) and a vector of 
transfers to each region ( i T ) taking into account the revenue collected through local taxes; (2) the 
CG’s mandate is to provide homogeneous healthcare coverage and ensure that every citizen has 
access to comprehensive healthcare services (i.e. CG wants each region to have enough resources 
to  produce  * i x ).  The  CG  (as  well  as  the  regions)  observes  spending  levels  but  does  not 
distinguish waste from efficient costs. 
The CG will then choose t so that total resources would be sufficient to pay for the production of 
the optimal level of healthcare in each region: 
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where LR  is the revenue collected at the local level and S the average regional spending. 
Given (A.2), regions’ optimal behaviour would be to set  i i " = 0 n . In equilibrium each region 
will be able to produce the optimal quantity and spending will be financed through transfers from 
the central budget, with tax revenue collected in rich regions used to finance spending in poor 
ones as well. All the regions will have as low as possible local taxation. Tax rates at local level 
would be correlated with neither the degree of efficiency in the production of healthcare nor the 
magnitude of income differentials.  
A.2 Fiscal decentralisation 
Assume now that a minimum local tax rate is mandated by law. Healthcare financing will then be 
split between revenue from a tax set by the CG (t), revenue from the mandatory local tax (m) and 
revenue from an optional local tax (ni).  
The CG distributes flat transfers to the regions. The transfer is a fraction of average regional 
spending: 30 
(A.3)   1       
~
< = b S b S  
and m is set by the CG so that the own mandatorily collected resources and the transfer are 
sufficient to finance Smin: 
(A.4)   min min S S b aS = + m  
(Smin is the minimum level of expenditure among regions and aSmin is the income in the region 
with the minimum level of expenditure). 
In this scenario, the CG will set the tax rate so that: 














Now suppose that regional governments have different beliefs with regard to the commitment of 
the CG to limit the transfer to  S
~
, i.e. some of the regions believe that the budget constraint is 
‘soft’ (J regions of type j) others that it is ‘tight’ (Z regions of type z, with J+Z=N). 
Regions of type j will set the optional local tax rate at the minimum ( j n =0), while regions of type 
z will put it equal to: 









The tax rate set at the central level will then be: 























1 m  
higher than if all the regions had believed the commitment of the government to transfer  S
~
 to 
each region. The maximum level of t would occur if none of the regions believed the government 
commitment, as in the ex post bail-out case with m =0. 
In  this  scenario  each  region  is  again  able  to  finance  the  preferred  level  of  spending 
( i i i w x C S + = ) (
* * ). 
Local tax rates would in any case be differentiated between regions, with  0 = j n  for the regions 
that did not believe the CG commitment and a positive optional local taxation in the regions that 
believed to have a tight budget constraint, except for the region with minimum spending if it 
happened to be of type z. 
No optional local tax would then reflect either a soft budget constraint belief, or a combination of 
healthcare demand, inefficiency and income levels so that:   31 
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Zero optional local taxes would not necessarily reflect a high level of efficiency. If the region 
believes in the central government’s commitment, this result could be due to low demand (for 
example due to a favourable health status of the population). 
Similarly, for the other regions of type z the ranking according to optional local tax rates would 
not necessarily reflect the ranking in terms of efficiency levels. Demand and income levels also 
play a role. 
Finally,  in  this  set-up  regions  that  overspend  with  respect  to  the  resources  drawn  through 
mandatory local taxes and the flat transfer set by the CG are not necessarily the most inefficient 
ones. Overspending which is ex post financed by the CG could be a signal of the region’s belief 
in the commitment of the CG to limit its transfers.  
The inability of the CG to infer efficiency levels from regional spending and tax levels reflects 
the  impossibility  of  observing  regions’  beliefs,  imperfect  knowledge  about  the  healthcare 
production function and the ultimate objective of the CG of financing the production of optimal 
levels of healthcare in all the regions. 
Given this framework, which outlines the financing of the healthcare sector over recent decades, 
we assume that regions are able to finance their preferred level of health services.  
 
Appendix B – Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our estimates, we perform a series of exercises described in Table B.1. 
First,  we  re-estimate  the  three  specifications  discussed  above  using  different  indices  for 
computing real values for per capita health expenditure and GDP.
53 All of them give very similar 
results (Figure B.1).
54  
Second, we estimate model 1a using alternative estimation techniques. We start by considering a 
stochastic frontier model
55 of the type: 
(B.1)  it it it x f c x ) ( =   
where  1 = it x  for the best unit in the sample and  1 > it x for the others. 
                                                 
53 Specifically, we consider three indices: GDP deflator, CPI, HICP for health product indices. The combinations 
considered are described in Table B.1. 
54 In particular, the correlation between the estimated regional effects ranges from 0.81 to 1.00.  
55 A drawback of this approach, however, is that using stochastic frontiers requires explicit assumptions in terms of 
the distributions involved. 32 
Table B.1  – Step 1 – Robustness checks  
Dependent variable
Population used to 
compute per capita 
values
Index used to compute real 
values (for health 
expenditure)








(using weights for 
hospital services)




(using weights for 
pharmaceuticals)
GDP Deflator GDP Deflator
Model 3a 
(Table 4)










(corrected to take 
into account patient 
mobillity)
A) panel fixed effects; B) stochastic frontier (time invariant); C) time varying 
stocahastic frontier; D) time varying fixed effect (Table 6)
Across indices used 
for computing real 
values
CPI index




We specify the efficient expenditure function as 
(B.2) 
b it cons
it e x f
x¢ + = ) (  
and hence we can write the estimating equation as 
(B.3)  it it it it u cons c n b + + ¢ + = x ln  
where  ) , 0 (   iid  
2
n s n N it  is the error term and  ) , (   iid  
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+  captures each region’s distance 
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56 In general, model (B.3) can be related to model (5). In particular, rearranging the estimating equation for model (5) 
with regional fixed effects we have that:  
ln(rexp_pcit) = [a+min(ai
￿ )] + [ai - min(ai)] + xit' b  + eit 
with  +¥ £ = - £ norm i i i   ) min( 0 a a a , which can be directly compared to (B.3)  where  +¥ £ £ it u 0 captures the 
inefficiency levels.    33 
 Figure B.1  Regional fixed effects 
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Initially, we assume that the stochastic frontier is invariant over time (Table B.2 – column B).
57  
We then consider a time varying version à la Battese and Coelli (1992):
58  




it N u u e u s m
h + - - =    
where the distance from minimum cost can be decomposed into two factors, a given level of 
inefficiency ui characterising each region and a time varying component, which is a function of 
time and a decay factor h  (Table B.2 – column C). 
We also estimate a fixed effect model with time varying regional effects. In particular, we derive 
an estimating equation equivalent to the time varying stochastic frontier described above (cf. 
B.5). In this case the expenditure equation becomes:
59 
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we derive the following estimating equation:
60 
                                                 
57 So that in terms of model (5) and rearrangenging the time invariant fixed effects, the estimation of ai - min(ai) is 
analogous to the estimation of ui. 
58 See Greene (2008) for a discussion of the available approaches to the analysis of economic efficiency. 
59 In terms of rearranging model (5) it is like writing: 
)) (min(
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with  0   = norm i a  for the best unit in the sample. 
60 This specification is analagous to those discussed in Cornwell et al. (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990), where the 
authors suggest substituting a constant inefficiency parameter with a quadratic specification as in (B.8).  34 
(B.8)  it
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From the estimates of (B.8) we can recover the parameters we are interested in: the regional (time 
invariant) effects ai and the decay factor 
η (Table B.2 – column D). In both time varying models 
(C and D) the estimated decay factor is negative and significant. This might reflect a common 
increasing  pattern  in  health  expenditure  which  could  be  due  to  the  impact  of  technological 
developments in the production of healthcare, in the organisation at national level of the health 
system or in the structure of preferences. 
Table B.2  Step 1 – Comparison: fixed effect and stochastic frontier estimation 
(standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) 
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Per capita GDP 0.00001 0.248 0.00001 ** 0.038 0.00001 ** 0.015 0.00000 0.328
Dependency ratio for children (0-4) -0.00645 0.279 -0.00255 0.456 0.00944 *** 0.003 -0.00038 0.915
Dependency ratio for elderly (75+) 0.04337 *** 0.010 0.03767 *** 0.000 0.04600 *** 0.000 0.03284 *** 0.000
Life expectancy (female) 0.04133 *** 0.003 0.05330 *** 0.000 0.03874 *** 0.000 0.02896 *** 0.009
Bad habit 0.02172 ** 0.015 0.01806 ** 0.024 0.02762 *** 0.000 0.03260 *** 0.000
Health status 0.01763 *** 0.008 0.01625 *** 0.004 0.00350 0.490 0.00530 0.412
Participation rate (female) 0.00154 0.703 0.00001 0.995 -0.00298 0.105 -0.00007 0.977
Tertiary education 0.00317 0.575 0.00504 0.358 0.00559 0.218 -0.01000 0.109
Share of employed in agriculture (%) -0.00678 * 0.089 -0.00720 *** 0.005 -0.00466 ** 0.018 -0.00451 * 0.079
Share of employed in manufacturing (%) 0.00127 0.254 0.00102 0.314 0.00176 ** 0.050 0.00195 * 0.061
Dummy for the years after 1995 -0.11747 *** 0.000 -0.12202 *** 0.000 -0.12103 *** 0.000 -0.12715 *** 0.000
Constant 3.11231 *** 0.003 1.96360 *** 0.006 2.89818 *** 0.000
No. Observations 294 294 294 294
F( 11,    20) 115.76
Prob > F 0.0000
R-squared 0.9304 1.0000
Adj R-squared 0.9222 1.0000
Root MSE 0.0453 0.0435
Wald chi2(11) 2672.1000 1027.9300
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Log likelihood 443.1939 482.0209
h -0.0458 *** 0.000 -0.0050 *** 0.000
Regional effects (a a a ai)
1 Piemonte -0.144  -0.051  -0.072  -0.100 
2 Valle d'Aosta 0.065 0.049 0.172 0.113
3 Lombardia -0.135  -0.058  -0.079  -0.081 
4 Bolzano 0.263 0.127 0.282 0.226
5 Trento -0.034  -0.012  -0.015  -0.018 
6 Veneto -0.131  -0.058  -0.095  -0.116 
7 Friuli Venezia Giulia -0.251  -0.099  -0.189  -0.174 
8 Liguria -0.270  -0.105  -0.210  -0.124 
9 Emilia Romagna -0.278  -0.107  -0.205  -0.151 
10 Toscana -0.260  -0.108  -0.208  -0.157 
11 Umbria -0.245  -0.107  -0.207  -0.142 
12 Marche -0.227  -0.103  -0.208  -0.143 
13 Lazio 0.104 0.046 0.156 0.160
14 Abruzzo -0.034  -0.023  -0.057  -0.028 
15 Molise 0.017 0.001 -0.036  -0.003 
16 Campania 0.412 0.170 0.284 0.221
17 Puglia 0.259 0.097 0.132 0.099
18 Basilicata 0.139 0.050 0.032 0.012
19 Calabria 0.223 0.082 0.111 0.103
20 Sicilia 0.285 0.112 0.158 0.149
21 Sardegna 0.243 0.098 0.257 0.155
*, **, *** significance at respectively 10, 5 and 1 per cent level
(1) Estimates by non-linear least square.
Time varying fixed effect (1)
Time varying stochastic 
frontier
(B)
Real total expenditure 
(corrected to take into 
account patient mobility)
Real total expenditure 
(corrected to take into 
account patient mobility)
(C) (D)
Real total expenditure 
(corrected to take into 
account patient mobility)
(A)
Real total expenditure 
(corrected to take into 
account patient mobility)
Panel fixed effect Stochastic frontier
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